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We analyze the security requirements on RFID protocols
to be used in supply chains. We perform a case study on a
recently proposed RFID authentication protocol specifically
designed for supply chains. We discuss several shortcom-
ings in this protocol related to mutual authentication, un-
linkability, and desynchronization and suggest possible im-
provements. We show how the flaws in the protocol can be
used to track products, relate incoming and outgoing prod-
ucts, and extort supply chain partners.
1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems identify
tags to readers in an open environment, requiring neither
visual nor physical contact for communication. Due to the
low production costs and very small size of the tags, RFID
system deployment is steadily increasing, thereby replacing
traditional identification methods such as bar codes. This is
particularly true in supply chains where RFID tags permit
a much more cost-effective and time-efficient tracing and
management of a product than bar codes.
While RFID systems make management more efficient,
they may also facilitate nefarious activities. Since neither
physical nor visual contact is required to communicate with
RFID tags, it becomes much easier for legitimate and ma-
licious entities alike to interact with the tags. For instance,
the ability to trace a product through a supply chain is vi-
tal for the product’s manager, but detrimental if it can also
be used by a competitor. Therefore, the security of tags,
readers, and any other components of an RFID system is
as important as the cost-effectiveness and time-efficiency.
In this paper, we report on the security of a communication
protocol between a tag and a reader proposed for use in sup-
ply chains [14]. In the following, we refer to this protocol
as LD after the last names of its authors.
The intention to keep RFID tags small and cheap in order
to facilitate large-scale deployment imposes significant lim-
itations on the communication protocol in terms of the num-
ber and type of cryptographic primitives that may be used.
Consequently, there is a wide variety of published proto-
cols aiming at achieving strongly secure, untraceable, and
efficient communication within today’s resource limitations
for RFID tags, a recent collection being [4, 8, 9, 12, 20].
The fact that actually all of the protocols in this collec-
tion have security flaws together with the significant num-
ber of publications containing attacks upon RFID protocols,
most recently [1, 5, 6, 10, 13, 18, 7] shows that the design
of resource-constrained, secure RFID protocols is still not
well-understood.
As observed in [14], protocols for the supply chain set-
ting differ from other RFID protocols in that they need to
support transfer of ownership from one supply chain part-
ner to another. Currently there are relatively few protocols
that handle ownership transfer [16, 17, 19].
In this paper, we show that in the LD protocol the own-
ership transfer mechanism introduces security flaws which
allow an attacker to trace tags through the supply chain, to
break authentication, and to switch tags to and from a non-
operational state. The salient part in the last attack is that
only the attacker can switch a non-operational tag back on
which in the supply chain scenario could be abused for ex-
tortion.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we ex-
plain our terminology and adversary model and we discuss
the security requirements for RFID protocols in a supply
chain setting. In Section 3 we describe the LD protocol. In
Section 4 we exhibit a flaw in the key update procedure that
allows for attacks on unlinkability. In Section 5 we show an
attack on authentication and discuss its consequences, and
in Section 6 we conclude with an outlook on future work.
2. Preliminaries
We begin by explaining our terminology and adversary
model and then proceed with the description of security re-
quirements for an RFID system to be used in supply chains.
In this paper, reader refers to the actual RFID reader as
well as the database communicating with the reader, since
this communication takes place over a secure channel. A
partner refers to the owner and operator of one or more
readers, all of which contain the same cryptographic key
material. Readers of different partners may contain differ-
ing cryptographic key material. An agent can be a tag or
a reader, while a role refers to the protocol steps a tag or
reader is expected to carry out. A run is the execution of a
role by an agent.
We use a standard Dolev-Yao intruder model in which
the adversary controls the network. Since there might be at-
tacks in this model which are not feasible in a real-world
RFID system, we discuss, when necessary, the circum-
stances under which a presented attack becomes feasible.
An RFID supply chain protocol should be considered a
multi-party protocol, since every tag is supposed to succes-
sively interact with a predefined series of readers. Thus the
intruder model should take malicious collaboration of part-
ners into account. This is typically modeled by allowing the
intruder to corrupt readers thus learning the reader’s cryp-
tographic keys. However, the attacks presented in the fol-
lowing sections can be carried out even under assumption
that partners are trusted (and thus their readers incorrupt-
ible). We discuss malicious collaboration of partners in the
concluding section.
We consider the following security properties to be rele-
vant for an RFID protocol in the supply chain setting.
1. Mutual authentication through recent aliveness and
agreement.
• Tag-to-reader authentication allows the partner to
verify that an incoming product is authentic. For
this purpose the recent aliveness security prop-
erty [15] suffices. Recent aliveness captures the
fact that the tag needs to have generated a mes-
sage as a consequence of a reader’s query. More
formally, a protocol guarantees to an agent a in
role A that any corresponding agent b in role B
has been recently alive, if and only if, whenever
a completes a run, there has been an event of b
during that run.
• Reader-to-tag authentication allows the tag to
verify that it is communicating with an autho-
rized reader. This is important in the present sce-
nario since a tag will need to be updated with
new cryptographic key material which the reader
sends to the tag. It is clear that the integrity of
the key-update message needs to be preserved.
Thus recent aliveness alone is not sufficient for
this purpose. The tag needs a guarantee that the
message containing key update information sent
by the reader is equal to the message received by
the tag. For this, the agreement [15] property is
necessary. Formally, a role A satisfies the agree-
ment property on a set of data items d if, when-
ever an agent a in role A completes a run of the
protocol with an agent b in role B, then b (in role
B) has been running the protocol with a in role
A and the two agents agreed on the data values in
d. Furthermore, each such run of a corresponds
to a unique run of b.
2. Untraceability and unlinkability
As observed in [14], it is important for a supply chain
partner to prevent outsiders from being able to corre-
late incoming and outgoing products. Thus an adver-
sary should not be able to trace products through the
supply chain, or at the least, he should not be able to
link incoming and outgoing products.
A protocol satisfies the untraceability property for
tags, if an adversary is not able to recognize a tag he
previously observed or interacted with. Formal defi-
nitions of untraceability have been given in [2, 11, 7].
The weaker notion of unlinkability requires that an ad-
versary cannot recognize a previously observed tag if
between the two observations the tag has communi-
cated with an authorized reader and updated its cryp-
tographic key material.
The mutual authentication and unlinkability properties
identified above correspond to the security requirements for
the LD protocol stated in [14].
It is worth noting that the LD protocol due to its key-
update procedure is a stateful protocol. Therefore the possi-
bility of desynchronization attacks needs to be considered.
In a desynchronization attack the adversary aims to disrupt
the key update leaving the tag and reader in a desynchro-
nized state and rendering future authentication impossible.
It can be argued that the existence of desynchronization at-
tacks implies the need for a desynchronization resistance
property. Currently, there is no formal definition of desyn-
chronization resistance for RFID protocols. In this paper,
we have put extra conditions on the reader-to-tag authenti-
cation property by requiring agreement on sent messages to
ensure some degree of desynchronization resistance. How-
ever, it is easy to see that in general, this extra requirement is
insufficient. For instance, even with an agreement property
the reader still has no guarantee that a tag has successfully
updated its keys.
3. Protocol description
The LD protocol [14] was designed to be a mutual au-
thentication protocol for re-writable RFID tags guarantee-
ing the unlinkability of tags in a supply chain. A supply
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a := ki ⊕ ki+1
b := h(a⊕ c⊕ ki)
a, b
if b = h(a⊕ α)
then α := α⊕ a
Figure 1. RFID protocol for supply chains
chain consists of a chain of partners, each of which is rep-
resented by a reader. Every reader Ri contains a secret ki,
as well as the secret of the next reader ki+1. Additionally,
every reader stores the identity c of every tag it may authen-
ticate. Every tag T contains a pseudonym α representing its
current temporary identity. The value of α is equal to c⊕ki
where ki is the secret of some reader Ri currently allowed
to identify and authenticate the tag.
The LD protocol is a challenge-response based protocol.
The reader Ri challenges tag T with a nonce r. The tag cal-
culates the xor of its current secret α and challenge r and
responds with the hash of this value. The reader considers
the tag authentic if it finds a secret c for which h(c⊕r⊕ki)
is equal to the received response. The reader may then stop
the protocol execution giving it the possibility to authenti-
cate the tag again in a future communication session. Al-
ternatively, the reader may send the update a = ki ⊕ ki+1,
accompanied by b = h(a⊕ c⊕ ki) to the tag. The tag then
verifies that b = h(a⊕α) and updates its secret α by xoring
it with a. In doing this, ownership of tag T is transferred
from reader Ri to reader Ri+1. The protocol is depicted as
a message sequence chart in Figure 1.
The message sequence chart shows the role names,
framed, near the top of the chart. Above the role names, the
role’s secret terms are shown. Actions, such as nonce gen-
eration, computation, verification of terms, and assignments
are shown in boxes. Messages to be sent and expected to be
received are specified above arrows connecting the roles. It
is assumed that an agent continues the execution of its run
only if it receives a message conforming to the specifica-
tion.
4. Unlinkability
The LD protocol has not been designed to be untrace-
able, but merely unlinkable. Indeed, the fact that a tag does
not introduce any randomness in its response to a reader’s
query implies that the tag is traceable between key updates.
In the following we show, however, that the protocol does
not provide unlinkability either by exhibiting an attack on
this property. We then discuss the flaw in the security anal-
ysis of LD in [14].
4.1. The attack
To show that the protocol does not satisfy unlinkability,
it suffices to exhibit a scenario in which the adversary rec-
ognizes a previously observed tag after the tag has updated
its secret α.
By eavesdropping on a valid authentication session be-
tween a tag and a reader, the adversary learns r, h(r⊕α), a
and b. At the end of its execution, the tag updates its secret
α by replacing it with α ⊕ a. The adversary can now chal-
lenge the tag with r′ = r⊕ a, to which the tag will respond
with h(r′ ⊕ α′). By a simple algebraic property of xor, the
response is equal to the previously observed one:
h(r′ ⊕ α′) = h(r ⊕ a⊕ α⊕ a) = h(r ⊕ α). (1)
In this context, we refer to the property of xor in equa-
tion (1) as the cancellation property, for obvious reasons.
The attack is depicted in Figure 2.
Even if we assume that an adversary is not able to get
close enough to a tag while it is being updated on a partner’s
premises, unlinkability can be plausibly broken. While
a tag’s sent messages can only be received within short
ranges, the messages sent from reader to tag can be cap-
tured from a long distance. Thus we may assume that an
adversary is able to eavesdrop on the reader’s messages. We
may further assume that the adversary can query incoming
and outgoing products while they are outside the restricted
area of a partner. Thus the following small extension of
the above attack then becomes very plausible in the sup-
ply chain scenario. The attacker generates a nonce r and
queries all incoming products with this nonce, observes the
reader’s key-update messages a, b, and queries all outgoing
tags with a⊕r. It now follows from equation (1) that eaves-
dropping on messages from reader to tag suffices to be able
to match the incoming products’ responses to the outgoing
products’ responses and thus link the products.
We have found the same type of flaw in several other
protocols. The last message from the reader to the tag in
the protocols in [22, 17, 12] contains the actual value with
which the tag should update its key. This message can be
observed and used by the adversary to break unlinkability
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a := ki ⊕ ki+1
b := h(a⊕ c⊕ ki)
a, b
α := α⊕ a
r ⊕ a
h(r ⊕ α)
Figure 2. Attack on unlinkability
in a manner similar to the one described above. The attacks
on these protocols are described in [21].
4.2. The flaw in the security proof
In the proof for the unlinkability claim [14, Statement
4.4] it is noted that the adversary may choose the same
nonce r = r′ for the challenge before a tag is updated
and after the tag is updated. It is then shown that in this
case the adversary is not able to link the two responses
t = h(r⊕c⊕k) and t′ = h(r⊕c′⊕k′) without knowledge
of the keys. However, setting r = r′ is not the best strategy
for the adversary. Since
h(r ⊕ c⊕ k) = h(r′ ⊕ c′ ⊕ k′)
⇐ r ⊕ c⊕ k = r′ ⊕ c′ ⊕ k′
⇐ r′ = r ⊕ k ⊕ k′ ∧ c = c′,
setting r′ = r⊕k⊕k′ is a better choice for the adversary.
Note that k and k′ do not have to be keys of successive
readers. By merely observing the key updates a chain of
readers R, . . . , R′ send to tags, the adversary can always
compute k ⊕ · · · ⊕ k′ = k ⊕ k′.
4.3. Recommendation
The flaw in the LD protocol affecting unlinkability is due
to the algebraic property of the xor operator shown in equa-
tion (1).
This flaw can be avoided if concatenation of terms inside
the hash functions is used instead of the xor operator, thus if
the reader sends h(a, (c⊕ki)) instead of b = h(a⊕ c⊕ki),
E





r, h(r ⊕ α)
α := α⊕ r
Figure 3. Attack on authentication
where the comma denotes concatenation. While this makes
the computation of the hash functions more expensive for
the tag, it is a much safer alternative. Replacing the xor
operator with any other operator with algebraic properties
is dangerous in this setting, since the alternative operator’s
algebraic properties may be used to obtain a relation similar
to equation (1).
Note that this improvement mitigates solely the xor can-
cellation attack on unlinkability. Further improvement are
suggested at the end of the following section.
5. Authentication
As indicated in Section 2, the LD protocol needs to pro-
vide tag-to-reader authentication in order to ensure that only
authentic products are accepted by a partner’s reader and
reader-to-tag authentication in order to guarantee that tags
only update their keys after communicating with a legiti-
mate reader. In this section, we take advantage of the xor
operator to impersonate a reader and thus to break reader-
to-tag authentication.
5.1. The attack
Recall that in the third protocol message the reader sends
a, b to the tag, where a = ki ⊕ ki+1 and b = h(a⊕ α). We
observe that the tag cannot verify the value of a, since ki
and ki+1 are not known to the tag. The tag only verifies that
the value of b is indeed equal to h(a⊕ α) and then updates
its secret α by xoring it with a.
Therefore, an adversary that is able to produce a valid
combination of a and b can successfully impersonate a
reader. To this end, the adversary challenges the tag with
r to obtain h(r⊕α) and then sends a = r and b = h(r⊕α)
to the tag. The tag accepts a and b, because b = h(a⊕α) =
h(r ⊕ α), thus authentication is broken. The attack is de-
picted in Figure 3.
Note that in order to mount this attack, the adversary
does not even need to have observed a communication be-
tween a tag and legitimate reader.
5.2. Consequences
When the adversary impersonates a reader with the at-
tack presented above, the tag updates its secret α to α ⊕ r.
This results in desynchronization of the tag’s state and the
supply chain partner’s database, since α is equal to c⊕r⊕ki
instead of c ⊕ kj for some j. The adversary can re-
synchronize the tag with the database by repeating the attack
with the same value for r so that the tag’s secret becomes
α⊕ r ⊕ r = α, that is, equal to the original value.
Note that only the attacker may re-synchronize the
tag with the database, since the nonce r was chosen by
him. Thus, the attacker can extort supply chain partners
by desynchronizing tags, virtually holding the products
hostage, and re-synchronizing them when his demands are
met.
Desynchronization attacks can also be used to trace tags.
Since desynchronized tags will lead to problems at a supply
chain partner’s location the attacker is able to trace the tags
through space and time.
5.3. The flaw in the security proof
The flaw in the LD protocol affecting reader-to-tag au-
thentication and leading to desynchronization and traceabil-
ity of tags is that the last message contains information
whose integrity the tag cannot verify but which is used to
update the tag’s secret.
In the proof of statement 4.1 in [14], it is argued that in
the LD protocol the correct third message a, h(a ⊕ c ⊕ ki)
can only be computed with knowledge of the tag’s serial
number c and the reader’s key ki. Since the adversary does
not know ki, the conclusion is that he cannot produce a mes-
sage which will be accepted by the tag. This reasoning does
not take into account the test the tag performs in order to
authenticate a reader. The tag does not verify whether the
reader can compute h(a ⊕ c ⊕ ki), but merely whether the
message a, b satisfies the equation b = h(a⊕α). As shown
in the attack, it is easy to produce such a message.
5.4. Recommendation
In order to break reader-to-tag authentication in LD, the
adversary takes advantage of xor’s cancellation property,
shown in equation (1), and the fact that the tag cannot verify
the integrity of the last message.
We have already advised against the use of xor in Sec-
tion 4.3. Furthermore, to authenticate a reader, the tag must
challenge the reader in the second message with a nonce the
tag created. There are several standard mechanisms for this
purpose. In the last message of the protocol, the reader must
place this nonce together with all terms whose integrity
needs to be protected inside a hash function only an autho-
rized reader can create. The format of the last message is
then m,h(n,m, k), where m contains the terms whose in-
tegrity needs to be protected, n is the tag’s nonce, and k is a
common secret. Such a construction proves to the tag that a
legitimate reader was recently alive and that it recently cre-
ated the integrity-protected parts in the last message. This
is, in principle, achievable with hash functions.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed the security of an RFID protocol
aimed at supply chain structures. We have identified flaws
in the protocol caused by the use of the xor operator and
lack of message integrity verification. We have shown how
these flaws can lead to attacks on authentication, untrace-
ability, unlinkability, and synchronization of cryptographic
key material. We have described the consequences these at-
tacks can have for supply chain partners and we have given
recommendations for improvements of the protocol. We
do not suggest, however, that merely applying the proposed
improvements will suffice to obtain a secure protocol. The
design and verification of such a protocol are beyond the
scope of this paper and will be considered in future work.
More generally, we believe that the attacks exhibited in
this paper highlight three interesting areas with open prob-
lems affecting the security of RFID protocols.
1. Operators with algebraic properties
The resource constraints imposed on RFID tags have
enticed protocol designers to take advantage of oper-
ators with algebraic properties due to their simplicity
and efficiency. As the attacks in this paper indicate, the
introduction of even the simplest operator, xor, into a
security protocol can lead to serious security problems.
It is therefore important to understand how to use op-
erators with algebraic properties safely and how to ver-
ify the security of protocols employing such operators.
Research into the latter question has been ongoing for
several years under the question of how to incorpo-
rate new cryptographic primitives into existing formal
models for verification of security protocols. It has
been shown [3] that the inclusion of the xor operator
into a Dolev–Yao-style formal model is not straight-
forward due to soundness problems with respect to its
cryptographic realization.
2. Definition and verification of new security properties
Formal definitions of unlinkability and untraceability
have only relatively recently been formulated and there
is still much room for improvement in the verification
of these properties.
Furthermore, the introduction of stateful RFID proto-
cols and the immediate proliferation of desynchroniza-
tion attacks, such as the one shown in Section 5.2, indi-
cate a strong need for a formal definition and methods
for the verification of desynchronization resistance.
3. Adversary model
The adversary model for supply chains presented in
Section 2 and also proposed in [14] requires that the
RFID protocol has to be secure even under the assump-
tion that partners collude in order to attack each other.
As noted in [14] the protocol considered in this pa-
per does not meet this requirement for the following
reasons. Since the knowledge of one key ki allows
the successive computation of all keys in the chain, it
is possible for one partner to attack all other partners.
For a merely curious partner, knowing the keys of other
partners allows for the linking of incoming and outgo-
ing products at those partner’s premises. More mali-
cious partners can even change product codes, intro-
duce new codes, and place the blame for faulty prod-
ucts on any other partner by using the other partner’s
key.
The possibility of such insider attacks poses a severe
security risk, since it implies that the negligence or ma-
licious intent of a single partner leads to security prob-
lems in the entire supply chain. As a consequence, a
potentially challenging open problem is the design and
verification of a practical light-weight RFID protocol
for supply chains secure under malicious collusion of
partners.
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